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Abstract 
This paper examines the effectiveness of urban containment policies to protect forestland from residential 
conversion and to increase the provision of forest public goods in the presence of irreversible investments and 
policy uncertainty. We develop a model of a single landowner that allows for switching between competing 
land uses (forestry and residential use) at some point in the future. Our results show that urban containment 
policies can protect (even if temporarily) forestland from being developed but must be supplemented with 
policies that influence the length and number of harvesting cycles if the goal is to increase nontimber benefits. 
The threat of a development prohibition creates incentives for preemptive timber harvesting and land 
conversion. In particular, threatened regulation creates an incentive to shorten rotation cycles to avoid costly 
land-use restrictions. However, it has an ambiguous effect on forestland conversion as the number of rotation 
cycles can also be adjusted to maximize the expected returns to land. Finally, in the presence of irreversibility, 
forestland conversion decisions should be done using real option theory rather than net present value analysis 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation  
Since the Second World War, America’s forestland resources have come under 
increasing pressure to develop. Between 1992 and 1997, over 11 million acres of private 
forest, cropland and open space were converted to urban and other developed uses across 
the contiguous United States, as population and personal incomes increased significantly. 
An additional 49.7 million acres of forest is projected to be converted to urban use by 2062 
(Alig et al. (2010)). 
Several state and local governments have responded to the adverse effects associated 
with rapid urban growth and increasingly land-consumptive development patterns by 
creating a wide range of policy instruments designed to manage urban growth and protect 
open space. Of the array of growth management techniques, urban containment policies 
such as Urban Growth Boundaries (UGBs), Urban Service Boundaries and Greenbelts are 
considered by some to be a promising approach. 
The rationale behind urban containment policies is the existence of market failures in 
land allocation. Many land uses generate externalities, which may distort market returns to 
alternative land uses (Brueckner (2000a, 2001)). For example, forestland produces both 
market and nonmarket benefits. While timber has a market price, most forest services do 
not have a market price to reflect the benefits they provide to society. Nonmarket benefits 
associated with private forestland include scenery, recreation, wildlife habitat, water 
resource protection, among others. As a result, market prices of forestland may be distorted 
below the social values. Another market failure is the under pricing of urban infrastructures 
which occurs because developers do not bear all the public infrastructure costs generated 
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with new development at the rural-urban fringe. As a result, private costs of land 
development are often distorted below the social costs. 
Intuitively, urban containment policies can have environmental impacts by forbidding 
or delaying development outside containment boundaries, and focusing demand for urban 
development areas within them. However, land management practices can also affect 
undeveloped land as ecological resources that provide wildlife habitat and other 
environmental benefits. For example, less intensive management and less frequent 
harvesting of remaining private forestlands can alter or improve certain habitat conditions 
on some private forestlands. Environmental protection is thus linked not only to protection 
of undeveloped land from conversion to irreversible land uses (such as residential, 
commercial, and industrial development) but also to land management practices. This raises 
the following question: Do urban containment policies actually improve the provision of 
environmental services and goods from private land? 
The goal of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of urban containment policies to 
protect forestland from residential development and to increase the provision of forest 
public benefits in the presence of irreversible investments and policy uncertainty. 
Building on the framework of Capozza and Helsley (1989) and Hartman (1976), we 
develop a model of a forest landowner operating in an open-city environment that allows 
for switching between competing land uses at some point in the future. The model 
incorporates public nontimber benefits of an even-aged forest in addition to the value of 
timber when it is harvested. Nontimber benefits are related to the forest stand age. Timber 
is exploited on a multiple rotation model à la Faustmann. Conversion to residential use is 
irreversible. 
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Within this setup, we study the impacts of actual development prohibitions by urban 
containment policies on the conversion of forests to residential use and forest management 
practices, which in turn have an impact on the production of public benefits. We consider 
two types of forest management practices: the length of a harvesting cycle (or rotation date) 
and the number of harvesting cycles. Following Turnbull (2004, 2005), we also examine 
how regulatory uncertainty affects private forestland conversion and forest management 
behavior. Landowners know with certainty the type of land use regulation that will affect 
their land but are uncertain towards when the development prohibition will take place. 
Our analysis reveals several interesting findings. Both private forest management 
practices and the timing of land conversion from forest to residential use do not respond to 
nontimber benefits in the socially optimal way. There are two reasons why this happens. 
First, since the landowner does not obtain commercial profits for nontimber benefits, he 
lacks the incentives to manage his land on behalf of such benefits. As a result, the rotation 
date choice and conversion timing are not efficient and a policy intervention can raise 
welfare.  
Whether a private landowner converts earlier than what is socially optimal depends on 
the type of forest externality and on the relationship over time between those externalities, 
timber revenues and residential rents. Furthermore, even under certainty, private forestland 
conversion can be optimally delayed beyond the point where net present values become 
nonnegative, if residential land rents grow over time and irreversibility of residential 
investments is accounted on land use decisions. This in turn implies that regardless of the 
presence of nontimber benefits, conversion of forestland to any other land use should be 
based on real option theory rather than on the traditional net present value rule. 
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Second, in the presence of a threat of development prohibition on the property, the 
forester has an incentive to reduce the risk of regulation, and the associated risk of financial 
loss, by decreasing the potential environmental value of the land. The longer the landowner 
waits before harvesting, the more likely that he will lose the possibility to convert land. The 
threat, rather than the regulation itself, creates an incentive to shorten rotation length to 
avoid costly land-use restrictions but has an ambiguous effect on conversion date even 
under risk neutrality. The impact of a threat on the timing of land development is 
ambiguous because the landowner can adjust the number of rotation cycles.1 In fact, the 
optimal response of the landowner may be to have more rotation cycles but of shorter 
length.2 In this case, the increase in the number of rotation cycles has a countervailing 
effect on the incentive to anticipate forestland conversion due to preemptive timber 
harvesting. 
Finally, we also show that protecting forestland from being converted to an irreversible 
land use may not be sufficient to increase the level of nontimber benefits. For regulated 
land, both an UGB and a Greenbelt unambiguously postpone the time of land development 
(temporarily or permanently, respectively) but have an ambiguous effect on forest 
management practices. The choice of rotation length can affect stand-age-dependent 
benefits and therefore it is not certain whether urban containment policies result in a 
socially efficient level of environmental protection. If the goal is to increase nontimber 
                                                 
1 This result contrasts with the conclusion of Turnbull (2004, 2005) that unregulated land subject to regulatory 
risk is generally developed more quickly than is socially efficient.  
2 This is almost certainly to be the case if land is potential habitat for an endangered species or if a mature 
forest can increase demand for outdoor recreation which in turn can trigger regulation to protect open space. 
In contrast, if the land harbors no potential for endangered species or any other environmental value but is 
under a threat of development prohibition by a growth management policy, then the length of a harvesting 
period and number of rotation cycles almost assuredly reinforce each other in the direction of earlier 
conversion. In this sense, growth controls could have the unintended short-run effect of inducing forestland 
conversion to residential use. 
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benefits from private forestlands, UGBs and Greenbelts should be supplemented with 
policies that affect timber harvest activity.  
Stated more generally, both land use change and land management practices affect the 
amount of public good provision from open space protection. Thus, any policy that focuses 
on land, but overlooks the management part of a private working landscape such as 
farmland or forestland is bound to fail in providing the efficient level of environmental 
benefits from open space protection. Moreover, land use change decisions based on the net 
present value methodology can lead to inefficient decisions. In contrast, real option theory 
can not only provide a lower bound for compensation payments as well as lead to efficient 
investment decisions. The reason is because real option theory takes into account future 
management practices, irreversibility as well as changes in the regulatory environment.3
Next, we provide a brief review of the literature in order to place our paper in context.  
 
1.2. Related Literature 
Our paper is related to three strands of the theoretical literature. One strand is the 
literature on urban growth models with perfect foresight, such as Capozza and Helsley 
(1989, 1990) and Capozza and Li (1994, 2002). The second strand is the literature on forest 
management practices in the presence of nontimber benefits, such as Hartman (1976) as 
well as Swallow et al. (1990). A third strand is the literature on the effects of land use 
policies on development timing, such as Turnbull (2002, 2004, 2005) and Brueckner 
(1990). 
                                                 
3 For more comparisons between the net present value and real option theory approaches see Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994). For an application of the real option theory to forest management decisions see Conrad 
(1997) and Reed (1993). Conrad (1997) values forest resources when the amenity value of old-growth follows 
a geometric Brownian process. Reed (1993) considers the decision to cut or preserve an old-growth forest 
when timber and amenity values follow a geometric Brownian process. None of these two studies takes into 
account conversion of forestland to an alternative irreversible land use or policy uncertainty. 
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While the increasing economic importance of open space and forest amenities (Leggett 
and Bockstael (2000), Tyrainen and Miettinen (2002), Geoghegan (2002), Irwin (2002)) 
and the implications of nontimber benefits for harvesting within the traditional Faustmann 
framework (Hartman (1976), Strang (1983), Swallow et al. (1990)) are well understood, the 
feedback effects between urban development and forestland changes are not. 
Theoretical models of forest management practices (Hartman (1976), Strang (1983), 
Swallow et al. (1990)) do not account explicitly for the potential conversion of forestland to 
an alternative use (such as agriculture or urban use) at some point in the future or for policy 
uncertainty. However, when conditions of irreversibility, price uncertainty and ability to 
delay exist, decisions entail an implicit option for the value of waiting (Capozza and Sick 
(1994)). In addition, the risk of a regulation creates incentives for investors to attempt to 
reduce the risk of exposing their land and investments to regulation, leading to distortions 
in the pace and pattern of investment (Turnbull (2004, 2005)). 
On the other hand, models of urban development have permitted consideration of key 
dimensions of decision making, for example intertemporal decisions (Arnott (1980), Fujita 
(1982), Capozza and Helsley (1989)) and house-price uncertainty (Capozza and Helsley 
(1990), Capozza and Li (1994, 2002)), and examined how these features influenced the 
resulting price gradient and land use pattern. Even though these models are forward-
looking it is assumed that the rental value of undeveloped land (typically agriculture) is 
constant over time and exogenous. Therefore, these models are not able to examine 
endogenous interactions between land management practices associated with alternative 
uses and development decisions or examine the impacts of land management decisions 
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(extract of resources) on the provision of open space benefits. Yet, if natural resources are 
extracted, or land is converted to an alternative land use, amenity values are lost.4  
Building on the framework of Capozza and Helsley (1989) and Hartman (1976) this 
paper develops a model of a single forest landowner that allows for switching between two 
competing land uses (forestry and residential use) at some point in the future. We examine 
development intensity when land is under residential use and the length and frequency of 
harvesting cycles when land is used as forest. In our model the rental value of undeveloped 
land is endogenously determined. These features allow us to examine how endogenous 
feedbacks between alternative land-uses impact development decisions and land 
management practices. It also allows to study the impacts of both land use change (through 
conversion) and land use management decisions on the provision of open space benefits. 
With regard to the impact of uncertainty on investment and development decisions, this 
paper departs from Capozza and Li (1994, 2002) and Capozza and Helsley (1990) by 
examining future use uncertainty on land management decisions.  
A third strand of the literature that relates to our work builds upon Capozza and Helsley 
(1989, 1990) and examines the effects of an UGB or a Greenbelt on urban development in a 
dynamic setting (Turnbull (2002, 2004, 2005), Brueckner (1990)). Brueckner (1990) 
examines how restrictions on the expansion of an UGB in a dynamic open city environment 
could increase land values and social welfare in the presence of a population externality. 
Turnbull (2002, 2004) investigate how private property rights under threatened regulation 
affect the timing and density of development in an urban land market. Turnbull (2002) 
focus on policies restricting allowed uses, while Turnbull (2004) focus on development 
timing restrictions. Turnbull (2005) provides an overview on how land use regulations 
                                                 
4 For an overview on urban growth models with perfect foresight see Brueckner (2000b). 
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affect the pace and pattern of urban development. 5 Yet, none of these studies examine the 
effects of threatened regulation on management practices and conversion decisions when 
the returns of competing uses are interdependent. Moreover, these studies do not account 
for environmental externalities directly linked to management land practices. As a result, 
the extent to which landowners can engage in preemptive behavior to avoid potential land-
use regulations cannot be fully examined within these frameworks. In contrast, our model 
allows us to examine preemptive behavior associated with land conversion and/or 
management practices of a parcel of land. It also allows us to explore the effects of zoning 
policies on land use and natural resource management. 
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical model 
and derives both the market conversion and rotation dates and the social benchmark. 
Section 3 examines the environmental impacts of an unanticipated development 
prohibition. We also examine the effects of policy uncertainty on private land development 
and forest management practices. Finally, section 4 offers conclusions.  
 
2. The Analytical Model 
2.1. Assumptions 
Suppose that at time  there is a parcel of bare land located 0=t x  miles from a central 
business district (CBD) and that an even-aged forest stand is planted at time zero. Let  
represent the initial planting costs in bare land. A forest provides a flow of public 
nontimber benefits while standing in addition to the value of timber when it is harvested. 
0c
 
                                                 
5 In Turnbull (2004, 2005) the underlying externality that justifies the land use regulation is associated to the 
existence of undeveloped land and disappears once the land is developed. 
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Timber Benefits 
Timber is exploited based on a multiple rotation model with clear-cut harvesting.6  
If trees are planted at and harvested at 0=t Tt = , then  represents the age of the trees 
and 
t
T  is the harvesting age. Note that T  is also the length of the harvesting cycle  and 
is denoted by rotation date. At each rotation date, the forest owner immediately plants the 
next age class. The sequence of jump points, , with
[ T,0 ]
jT ∞≤= Kj ,....,2,1 , determines the stand 
rotation periods. All rotation cycles have the same length.7
Timber prices, p , and harvesting and replanting costs, , are assumed to be exogenous 
and constant over time. Let  represent the volume of commercially valuable timber 
biomass on a forest stand over the rotation age 
c
)(Tv
T , which is assumed to be a strictly concave 
function. The present value at time 0=t  of the financial reward from harvesting the stand 
at  is given by: jTt =
K1,...,j  ,))(( =− −rjTecTpv                                                                                               (1) 
where r is the discount rate and ))(( cTpv −  is the value of timber net of harvesting and 
replanting costs, which is constant over rotation cycles.  
 
Nontimber Benefits 
                                                 
6 Clear-cut harvesting is a harvesting technique that involves harvesting all the trees in one area at one time. 
7 Note that is an index that pertains to the ordinal sequence of harvests. For example, if the 
rotation date is 20 years, then harvests occur at each date 
Kj ,...,2,1=
,....60,40,20=t since the interval between 
successive harvests is constant over time. 
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Nontimber benefits are a function of the age of the trees. Let  denote the value of 
nontimber benefits from the standing forest of age .
)(tF
t 8 It is usually assumed that 0)( >
∂
∂
t
tF , 
indicating that a mature forest provides more nontimber benefits than a young forest. 
However, this assumption has been challenged by Englin and Klan (1990) and Swallow et 
al. (1990) who argue that nontimber benefits may follow any time path, depending on the 
externalities considered.9 In the analysis that follows, the only restriction placed on  is 
differentiability. The present value of amenity services from the forest stand under a single 
harvest cycle of length 
)(tF
T  is given by: 
∫ −
T
rt dtetF
0
)(                                                                                                                      (2) 
Conversion to Residential Use 
At each point in time, the forest landowner must decide to harvest the forest and replant 
the land, delay the harvest decision or decide to harvest the forest and convert the land into 
residential use. Let DT  represent the time of land development, also denoted by conversion 
date. In order to make the problem more tractable we postulate that conversion of 
forestland to residential use occurs at the end of a rotation cycle, that is, 
                                                 
8 The value of some nontimber benefits such as recreational benefits, aesthetic views, watershed protection 
and carbon storage may depend on the distance to the CBD, so that we would have . For simplicity we 
assume that nontimber benefits do not depend on distance to the CBD. 
),( xtF
9 Some wildlife species are best adapted to early plantation stages of forest (as in the case of moose) or forage 
production for cattle grazing. Other wildlife species (including trout) are more adapted to mature forests and 
greater scenic beauty can also be associated to old growth forests. Swallow et al. (1990) present alternative 
functional forms to capture the effects of age on various types of nontimber benefits. There are nevertheless 
other nontimber values of forestlands for which it is not the age of the trees that is important, but rather, the 
rate of tree growth. For simplicity, we do not consider those cases in our analysis. However, one example of 
such nontimber benefits is carbon sequestration. For a theoretical discussion on how the Faustmann harvest 
age is affected by the inclusion of carbon sequestration benefits see Van Kooten et al. (1995). 
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KTT D = , .∞≤≤ K0 10 Forestland conversion involves a one-time cost D  for clearing the 
land. Residential development once undertaken is irreversible. Land, housing and input 
markets are competitive markets. 
 
Housing Bid Rent Function 
A representative household enjoys utility from housing, q ,and a composite consumption 
good, g . Households’ preferences are represented by a strictly quasi-concave utility 
function . We set the price of the composite good equal to 1 and housing demand is 
also fixed at one unit. The household budget constraint is given by 
),( qgU
xtztybg )()( −=+ , 
where x  denotes distance to the CBD,  commuting costs per mile at time t ,  is the 
rental price of housing and  denotes income earned at time . 
)(tz b
)(ty t
The housing bid rent function is determined via the no arbitrage condition, which 
implies that in equilibrium, utility must be identical regardless where an urban resident 
lives; otherwise, some urban residents will have an incentive to move.11 The housing bid 
rent function is defined as:  
))(,1,)()((),( tUxtztybxtb −=                                                                                            (3) 
Equation (3) describes the maximum rent per unit floor area that a household is willing 
to pay at distance x  from the CBD if it is to receive a fixed level of utility )(tU . )(tU  is 
assumed to be exogenous. It is also assumed that ,  and  )(ty )(tz )(tU  vary over time in a 
                                                 
10 This assumption is quite plausible given that working forests are associated with long rotation cycles. As 
noted in (1) revenues from forestry are received after a multi-year rotation period. This delay occurs because 
growth in stand value is non-linear. As a result optimal rents cannot be extracted if harvest occurs before the 
optimal rotation period. Therefore, early harvest implies an opportunity cost that varies with the stand’s 
lifetime. 
11 See Appendix-B for further details on how to derive the housing bid rent function. 
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way that ensures that 0),( >
∂
∂
t
xtb  so that housing bid rents rise over time.12 Moreover the 
housing bid rent is a decreasing function of distance from the CBD, 0)(),( <−=
∂
∂ tz
x
xtb . 
 
Residential Development Density 
Housing floor space is produced with capital and land according to a strictly concave, 
constant returns to scale production function. The intensive form of the production function 
is written as , where  is capital per unit of land, referred to as structural density, and 
 satisfies 
)(Sh S
h 0)( >
∂
∂
S
Sh  and 0)(2
2
<
∂
∂
S
Sh . At each point in time, the landowner chooses the 
amount of structural density  to maximize the gross profit per unit of land at locationS x , 
while taking into account (3): 
)())(),1,)()(( ShtUxtztybMax
S
−                                                                                         (4) 
The first-order condition for the maximization problem (4) is given by:  
0)())(,1,)()(( =
∂
∂
−
S
ShtUxtztyb                                                                                          (5) 
Density condition given by equation (5) requires that more density should be added up 
to the point where the value of incremental gross profit from greater density equals zero. 
The solution to equation (5) gives structural density as a function of  and t x , 
                                                 
12 This requires that disposable income xtzty )()( −  is increasing sufficiently rapidly (or falling sufficiently 
slowly) relative to utility. 
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))(,1,)()((),( tUxtztySxtS −= . Note that residential development becomes denser over time 
since housing bid rents increase smoothly over time: 0
)(),(
)(),(
),(
2
2 >
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
S
Shxtb
S
Sh
t
xtb
t
xtS . 
Residential Land Rent Function 
Since the urban land market is competitive, the residential land rent function, , is 
given by the zero profit condition, which implies: 
),( xtR
)),(())(,1,)()((),( xtShtUxtztybxtR −=                                                                              (6) 
where ))(,1,)()((),( tUxtztySxtS −= . Since housing bid rents and development intensity 
increase over time, residential land rents also grow over time. 
 
2.2. The Social Planner's Problem  
The goal of the social planner is to choose the rotation length, , and number of 
rotation cycles, , in order to maximize the social present value of land taking into 
account (6), 
0≥T
0≥K
KTT D =  and Ν∈K . The social value of convertible forestland at time 
, , is given by:0 SPV  13
∫∫
∞
−−−
−
−
−+
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+
−
−
−
+−=
KT
rKTrt
T
rt
rTrT
rKT
SP DedtextRdtetF
e
cTpv
e
ecTKV ),( )())((
1
1),(
0
0          (7) 
Our framework differs from the conventional forest economic model by incorporating 
in (7) the possibility to convert forestland to residential use at some point in the future. 
When the landowner has perfect foresight and conversion to an alternative use is 
irreversible, the optimal rotation length can no longer be determined in isolation. Instead, 
                                                 
13 By choosing T  and K , the social planner chooses the rotation date and the conversion date. 
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the rotation length must be optimized together with development timing. The optimal 
solution then combines aspects of the conventional forest economic model with a model of 
irreversible urban growth under perfect foresight.  
The first two terms on the right-hand-side of (7) represent the present value of forest 
rents. It includes the present value of the net revenues from timber exploitation at the end of 
each rotation and the present value of nontimber benefits from a standing forest up to the 
date of conversion net the initial planting costs.14 The two last terms of (7) are the present 
value at time  of future residential rents from the date of conversion onward net the 
present value of conversion costs at time
0=t
KT . 
Table 1: Appendix-A presents the conventional criteria applied to the problem of 
choosing the optimal rotation length under certainty, including maximizing the net present 
value of timber income (Faustmann rotation), and maximizing the present value of timber 
and nontimber benefits (Hartman rotation). Table 1 also summarizes the first-order 
conditions for later comparison with our results. 
 
The Social Rotation Date 
Differentiating (7) with respect toT , for a given K , and rearranging the terms, yields: 
                                                 
14 Nontimber benefits over one harvest cycle are given by the sum of the annual nontimber benefits received 
at rate , compounded as timber grows to age )(tF T . We can easily modify our model to include also 
nontimber benefits from the existence of forestland. Let δ (t), KTt <≤0 be the open space externality at 
time . Adding  to (7) would thus capture an open space externality from the existence of 
undeveloped land. However, our fundamental model results would not change with the inclusion of this type 
of nontimber benefit. 
t ∫ −
KT
rt dtet
0
)(δ
 
 
15
[ ]
⎥
⎥
⎦
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⎢
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⎢
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⎡
+−
−
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−
−
+
+
⎥
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⎦
⎤
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⎣
⎡
−
−
+−
−
=
∂
∂
∫
∫
−−
−
−
−−
T
rtrT
rTrKT
rT
T
rt
rTrT
dtetFecTpv
e
rrDxKTR
e
eK
TFdtetF
e
rcTpv
e
r
t
Tvp
0
0
)())((
1
),(
1
)1(
)()(
1
))((
1
)(
                      (8) 
Equation (8) represents the socially optimal rotation length condition for a given 
number of rotation cycles. This condition can be interpreted as a Faustmann-Hartman like 
equation that includes a new component associated with the switch to residential use at 
time KT . We denote this new component by the “switching balance”. 
The left-hand side of (8) is the marginal benefit of waiting out the harvesting, which 
consists of the increase in the value of timber if harvesting is delayed one year. The right-
hand side of (8) is the marginal cost of waiting out the harvesting and comprises three parts. 
The first term represents the cost of holding the growing stock ( ) plus the cost of 
holding the land for future rotations (
)(Trpv
c
e
cTpvr rT −−
−
1
)( ).15
The second term represents the “externality balance” found in the Hartman framework, 
which compares the value of nontimber benefits at the harvesting time ( ) and the 
discounted value of the accumulated nontimber benefits associated with the growth of the 
trees until felling (
)(TF
∫ −−−
T
rtdt
rT etFe
r
0
)(
1
). The sign of this externality balance depends on the 
shape of the nontimber benefits function, . When larger external benefits are associated 
with larger and older trees, the externality balance is negative. In this case, it is optimal to 
postpone harvesting. In contrast, when nontimber benefits are larger for smaller and 
)(tF
                                                 
15 The cost of holding the growing stock is the amount of interest payment the landowner would get if he sells 
the stand at time  and invests the money at interest rate T r  for one year. The cost of holding the land for 
future rotations represents the soil rent the landowner should charge himself for waiting one more year. 
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younger trees, the externality balance is positive, and shortening the harvesting time is 
optimal. 
Together, the first two terms on the right-hand side of (8) assume land will be kept as 
forest through an infinite sequence of harvests. When ∞→K , equation (8) is reduced to the 
first-order condition for the Hartman setup.16 When in addition, nontimber benefits are 
zero, equation (8) is reduced to the first-order condition for the Faustmann setup.17 Table 1: 
Appendix-A summarizes these first-order conditions. 
The third term on the right-hand side of (8) is the “switching balance” which accounts 
for the fact that land may not be kept forever in forest use, that is, . If land is 
converted at 
∞<≤ K0
∞<KT  , the opportunity cost of postponing harvest assuming that land will be 
forested forever has to be adjusted by the timber and nontimber benefits that will not occur 
past the conversion date KT  (that is, 
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+−
− ∫
−−
T
rtrT
rKT
rT
dtetFecTpv
e
rKe
0
)())((
1
). In addition, 
the Hartman formula in the presence of switching must also account for the opportunity 
cost of delaying development which is given by the present value of residential land rent 
net of the annualized cost of development, [ ]rDxKTR −),( . 
When the “switching balance” is positive, the net present value of residential land rents 
is greater than the present value of timber and nontimber benefits if land is kept under 
forestry management from ∞<KT  onwards. This implies that, for a given K , the social 
rotation length in the presence of switching is always shorter than the Hartman rotation 
                                                 
16 In special cases, stand-age-dependent externalities may result in a socially optimal rotation length that is 
infinite to benefit specifies that require old-growth habitat or instantaneous to benefit species that prefer open 
field habitat (Hartman (1976)). Stand-age-dependent externalities can also conduct to non-convexities of the 
objective function in the choice variable (rotation length), so that more than one local optimum may exist 
when choosing the rotation length (Swallow et al. (1990)). 
17 The Faustmann rotation rule determines when to harvest a stand of trees when timber prices are constant by 
comparing the net benefits from letting timber grow to the land opportunity cost without taking into account 
nontimber benefits or alternative irreversible investment opportunities (see Table 1: Appendix A).  
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length due to concavity of . Therefore, switching to an alternative higher valued land 
use in the 
)(tv
KT  period may affect the choice of the social length of timber rotation. 
Moreover, decisions based on the Hartman rotation length do not necessarily yield the 
greatest net benefit to society. 
 
The Social Conversion Date 
Equation (8) implicitly defines the rotation date as a function of K , that is, . The 
goal of the social planner is now to choose 
)(KT
Ν∈K  to maximize . Let ))(,( KTKV SP spK  be 
the optimal number of rotation cycles. The socially optimal conversion date is given by: 
)( spspDsp KTKT =                                                                                                           (9) 
The social land conversion rule is described as follows: convert the entire parcel of land 
to residential use at time spspTK  if and only if the following condition is satisfied: 
⎥
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),( 0                                  (10) 
According to (10) a parcel of land should be converted at time spspTK  when the 
residential land rent is no less than the flow cost of conversion plus the forgone value of 
forestland. The forgone value of forestland is given by the present value of the sum of 
harvest revenue and monetary value of nontimber benefits over an infinite time horizon 
after conversion. When the switching balance is positive, it is always the case that 
condition (10) is met in inequality implying that, for a given K , conversion to residential 
use occurs earlier than when the switching balance is zero. 
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A comparison between (8) and (10) also shows there is interdependency between the 
conversion date and the rotation date. This implies that forest management decisions can 
influence the optimal development timing. Changes in harvesting decisions change the 
opportunity cost of residential land use and therefore, have an impact on the social optimal 
timing of land development. Changes in harvesting decisions may occur due to changes in 
timber prices ( p ) or harvesting and replanting costs ( c ). Different types of nontimber 
benefits impact differently the socially optimal rotation date and thus, the socially optimal 
conversion time.  
Finally, if ∞=spT  it is never optimal to harvest the stand from a social perspective and 
land is kept in natural forest management forever.18 In this case, the marginal benefit of 
postponing harvest is always greater than its marginal costs. If ∞=spK  then it is never 
socially optimal to convert land to residential use. In contrast, if  and , 
it is socially optimal to convert immediately the parcel of forestland to residential use. 
0=spK ∞<< spT0
 
2.3. The Private Landowner’s Behaviour  
Private rotation date ( pT ) and private number of rotation cycles ( pK ) decisions are 
made to maximize the present value of future private net returns to land. The landowner 
receives forest rents before land is developed and residential land rents after the land is 
converted to residential use. The present value of future private net returns to land, , is 
given by: 
PV
∫
∞
−−
−
−
− −+−
−
−
−=
KT
rKTrt
rT
rKT
rTP DedtextRc
e
ecTpveTKV ),( 
1
1))((),( 0                        (11) 
                                                 
18 If forestland preservation is socially optimal this requires both ∞=spT  (trees are never cut) and  
(land is never developed). 
0=spK
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Equation (11) can be re-written as: 
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The first term on the right-hand-side of (12) is the net present value of perpetual timber 
returns. The second term shows the value of the landowner’s option to convert the land to 
residential use. The value of convertible forested land is equal to the sum of the present 
value of timber plus an option value. This option value is the amount of compensation a 
well-informed landowner would require if the landowner would give up his development 
rights. As , (12) converges to the objective function under the Faustmann model. 
That is, the option value decreases as the conversion date becomes further out in the future. 
For forestland with no conversion potential for residential use, the option value becomes 
zero. 
∞→K
 
Private Rotation Date 
The first order condition for the private rotation date,  given a,T K , is given by: 
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A comparison of (13) with (8) shows two interesting results. Because the private 
landowner fails to account for any nontimber benefits, there is a divergence between the 
social ( spT ) and the private ( pT ) rotation lengths. For a given K , depending on the type of 
forest externalities, the private rotation length can be shorter or longer than the socially 
optimal one. For example, if larger externalities are associated with larger and older trees 
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( 0)( >
∂
∂
t
tF ), the socially optimal rotation length will be longer than the privately optimal 
length. While this conclusion may not be a surprise our analysis shows that if the switching 
balance is positive (second term on the right-hand-side of (13)), the privately optimal 
rotation age ( pT ) is actually shorter than the Faustmann rotation period ( FT ) due to 
concavity of  (see also table 1, Appendix-A).)(tv 19
In addition, changes in rotation length decisions resulting from population growth or 
income growth (as described by increases in residential land rents) can affect forests as 
ecological resources that provide wildlife habitat and other benefits.20 Since nontimber 
benefits are a function of the age of the trees, rotation decisions affect the amount of 
nontimber benefits provided by the forest. 
 
Private Conversion Date 
The private optimal number of rotation cycles, pK , is determined as the K  that 
maximizes  and is given by . The private 
landowner’s optimal conversion decision rule is to convert the entire parcel of land to 
residential use at time 
)),(( KKTV P ppppD TKKTKT == )(
ppTK  if and only if: 
p
p
rT
prT
pp
e
cTpverrDxTKR
−
−
−
−
+≥
1
))((),(                                                                     (14) 
where )),(())(,1,)()((),( xTKShTKUxTKzTKybxTKR pppppppppp −= . 
                                                 
19 In our problem K  is required to be an integer number, therefore it is possible that land is converted when 
the switching balance is still positive. 
20 Kline et al. (2004) provide empirical support that population growth and urban expansion are correlated 
with reduced forest management and investment on private forestlands in Western Oregon, USA. Empirical 
studies by Barlow et al. (1998) and Munn et al. (2002) for Alabama, US and Mississippi, US, and Wear et al. 
(1999) for Virginia, US also suggest that harvesting and commercial forest management decline as forest 
landscapes become more populated. 
 
 
21
It is clear from inspection of (14) and (10) that if the private landowner fails to account 
for all standing values, the choice of “if when” to switch to residential use is also privately 
inefficient. Thus, conversion may occur more often than is socially optimal. The private 
incentive for earlier conversion exists regardless of the type of nontimber benefits. 
Condition (14) also illustrates three interesting remarks. The first one is that a private 
landowner will delay conversion of forested land to residential use either because the 
opportunity cost increases or the net value from residential development decreases. The 
forester will delay conversion to residential use at time KT  if the value of timber net of 
harvesting and replanting costs ( cTpv −)( ) increases, if he incurs large conversion costs 
( D  increases), if urban residents incur larger commuting costs ( ), if urban income 
( ) decreases and if his land is located far away from a CBD (
)(KTz
)(KTy x  increases). 
The second remark is that our conversion rule differs from the conventional conversion 
rule in forest economic models under certainty. The standard assumption in these models is 
that if conversion of forestland takes places, it takes place immediately ( ); if it is not 
converted at  then land remains under forestry forever. By letting , it can be 
shown that land would be converted immediately only if 
0=t
0=t 0=K
F
F
rT
FrT
e
cTpveD
r
xR
−
−
−
−
≥−
1
))((),0( , 
where is the Faustmann rotation period. That is, land is converted as soon as the present 
value of residential development, net of conversion costs, exceeds the present value of the 
current use. However it maybe optimal to delay conversion in order to realise returns to 
forest until they are exceeded by residential returns net conversion costs, even if residential 
FT
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value already currently exceeds forested land value.21 By relying on a one period rule, the 
conventional forest conversion model implicitly assumes that an investment can be 
reversed if the market is less favourable in subsequent periods. Yet, conversion to any 
urban use (such as residential development) is an irreversible investment.  
The value of the right to delay the conversion decision equals the cost of the mistake 
one commits by using the net present value rule in this setting. As long as the option value 
(the second term on the right-hand-side of equation (12)) exceeds 
F
F
rT
FrT
e
cTpveD
r
xR
−
−
−
−
−−
1
))((),0( , it is optimal to delay conversion to period 
, even under certainty. Hence, in addition to the cost of conversion and the 
loss of timber value, there is an additional opportunity cost of converting today instead of 
waiting and keeping the conversion option open. This additional opportunity cost must be 
taken into account by the private forest landowner when deciding to convert forestland to 
residential or any other irreversible land use regardless of the presence of open space 
externalities. 
0>= ppTKt
Our results thus show that when the forestland conversion decision is based on real 
option theory rather than on the traditional net present value rule, conversion of forestland 
is delayed. Note also that forestland conversion can be delayed further if residential density 
is endogenous rather than fixed. If the landowner commits today to the currently optimal 
intensity, he sacrifices some revenue in the future compared with what he would obtain by 
                                                 
21 It is advantageous for the landowner to keep the land in forestry as long as the annual returns from forestry 
(given by the current level of timber prices and growth rates) are higher than the returns from residential use, 
net of conversion costs. However, in order for forestland conversion occur it is necessary that returns to forest 
use do not grow at a rate larger than the growth rate of residential returns; otherwise, land will never be 
converted to residential use even if currently returns to residential use exceed returns to forestry because of 
irreversibility. It is also necessary that the landowner’s discount rate is higher than the growth rate of 
residential returns. Otherwise, the landowner would find it optimal to delay investment indefinitely. See Table 
3: Appendix-A. 
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building at a higher residential density later. The reason is because optimal structural 
density is positively related to residential land rents and residential structures are 
irreversible investments. 
Equation (14) also contrasts with the deterministic development timing condition in the 
existing literature on urban growth with perfect foresight and irreversible conversion 
(Brueckner (1990), Capozza and Helsley (1989, 1990), Capozza and Li (2002), Turnbull 
(2005)), which assumes an exogenous opportunity cost for urban use. Typically, these 
models assume a constant agricultural rent per acre as the alternative rent to urban use. In 
the context of our analysis, the alternative land use to urban development is endogenously 
determined and feedbacks on the rental value of the developed state.22  
Formally, note that T  is a function of K  in (14), which implies that changes in K  
change both the left and the right hand sides of (14). If management practices were fixed 
and/or exogenous so that T  was held constant (or exogenous), the right-hand side of (14) 
would be constant just like in the urban growth models, and the optimal development time 
would be obtained adjusting K  on the left-hand side of (14).23 Therefore, our conversion 
timing condition is more general than the one emerging from urban growth models with 
perfect foresight and irreversible conversion. 
Table 3-Appendix-A summarizes the optimal conversion decision rules under certainty 
discussed in this section and show that delaying forestland conversion to residential use 
relative to the traditional nonnegative NPV rule can be optimal even under certainty. For 
                                                 
22 Another feature of our model is that land conversion occurs with discrete jumps. Note that changes  in the 
(integer) number of rotation cycles cause discrete changes in the conversion date, while changes in a constant 
agricultural rent cause a continuous change in the development timing. 
23 Note that in this case K  is enough to determine the optimal development timing since KTT D =  and T  is 
held constant or is exogenous implying that the return from the alternative use is also constant/exogenous, just 
like in the urban growth models under perfect foresight and no uncertainty. 
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completeness, we also present in Table 2-Appendix A the optimal conversion decision rule 
in the presence of public nontimber benefits. 
 
3. Urban Containment Policies 
The private landowner does not take into account public nontimber benefits when 
deciding rotation and conversion dates. Without any form of government intervention, 
society faces the classic problem of suboptimal provision of a public good. 
This section examines the effectiveness of a development prohibition by an actual 
regulation to postpone conversion of forested land into residential use and to increase the 
provision of nontimber benefits. We examine two types of development prohibitions: a 
temporary development prohibition due to imposition of a binding UGB and a permanent 
development prohibition due to a binding Greenbelt.24 In addition, we also examine how a 
development prohibition probability impacts conversion and rotation dates. Below we 
present the main results of our analysis.25
 
4.1. Development Prohibition under Certainty  
Temporary Development Prohibition 
                                                 
24 A Greenbelt refers to a physical area of open space (farmland or forest) that surrounds an urban area, and it 
is intended to be a permanent barrier to urban growth. Development is strictly regulated or prohibited on 
greenbelts. Greenbelts can be created by public or nonprofit purchase of open space or permanent transfer of 
development rights or they can be created and enforced by regulation of private property. Only a few 
communities in the United States have greenbelts explicitly designed to control urban growth. Boulder, 
Colorado is one example where such policy is in place. An Urban Growth Boundary consists of drawing a 
line around an urban area within which development is encouraged, often with density bonuses or minimum 
density requirements, to accommodate expected growth over 20 to 30 years. Land outside the boundary is 
generally restricted to resource uses and to very low-density residential development. In contrast to 
greenbelts, UGBs are not intended to be permanent. In Oregon, the Land Conservation and Development Act 
of 1973 requires the delineation of UGBs around all of the state’s cities and around the entire Portland 
metropolitan area. Among Oregon cities subject to this law, Portland is the best well known city for creating a 
model of urban containment. For a review on urban containment policies in the US see Pendall et al. (2002).  
25 All mathematical derivations are provided in Appendix-B. 
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Suppose that at  there is already in place an UGB postponing until a specified date 
development of any sort on any plot of land located past a certain distance from the CBD. 
Let’s assume that our plot of land is located outside the boundary and thus, the forest 
landowner cannot convert his land to residential use prior to . 
0=t
UGBxt )(
The goal of the private landowner is to choose the rotation and conversion 
dates,{ }0,0 >> cc TK , in order to maximize the net private returns to land: 
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taking into account that land can be converted to residential use at any . Land 
can only be converted at the end of a rotation period, therefore . 
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Condition (16) is the rotation date condition for a given K . It has the same 
interpretation as the unconstrained private condition (13). Conditions (17) and (18) are the 
conversion date conditions. Recall that the landowner’s private conversion date in the 
absence of an UGB is given by ppTK , satisfying ⎥
⎦
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by (14). Moreover a binding UGB requires that the regulation does not expire before the 
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unregulated private conversion date, that is, . Otherwise, the UGB would 
not change any of the plans of the forest landowner and the forester’s strategy would be the 
same as that under no development prohibition. Thus, a binding UGB ensures that 
ppUGB TKxt >)(
UGB
rT
rT
xtKTcTpv
e
errDxKTR )(,))((
1
),( ≥∀
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
+>
−
−
. As a result, with a binding UGB, 
the landowner converts his land to residential use at , which is the date 
established by the local government. 
UGBxtt )(=
Given that the landowner optimal conversion time is , the optimal 
strategy 
UGBcc xtTK )(=
{ }cc TK ,  under this policy is such that it satisfies (16). Therefore, we have that: 
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And cT  is implicitly determined by: 
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If properly set, a UGB can delay development in areas outside the urban boundary 
( ) and temporarily protect land from residential conversion. While 
an UGB can regulate the type of land use on a plot of land, this instrument does not 
regulate management practices. As a result, forest management practices outside the 
boundary will not be socially optimal (
UGBppD xtTKT )(<=
spc TT ≠ ) since the private landowner does not take 
into account any of the nontimber benefits from a standing forest when managing his 
forestland during the UGB period. Moreover, whether pc TT
<
>  depends on the net impact 
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the regulated conversion date has on the “switching balance” (second term on the right-
hand-side of (20)). If the impact on the forgone net value derived from residential land use 
( ) dominates the impact on timber revenue interests when harvesting at 
, the optimal rotation decreases due to concavity of , that is, . If nontimber 
benefits are increasing with the age of the forest stand, then an UGB has a negative impact 
on the provision of old-growth benefits from forestland that actually becomes subject to a 
temporary development prohibition.
rDxxtR UGB −),)((
cT )(tv pc TT <
26
 
Permanent Development Prohibition 
Let’s assume now that there is a greenbelt in place and that our plot of land is located 
inside the belt. Under this policy forestland can never be converted to residential use, that 
is, . The maximization problem of the forester is thus reduced to the Faustmann 
multiple rotation problem. 
∞→K
In contrast to the temporary case, a permanent development prohibition is able to keep 
forestland from ever being converted to residential use. If nontimber benefits are unrelated 
to the age of the forest, a greenbelt can also attain the goal of permanently increasing the 
provision of nontimber benefits associated to the existence of undeveloped land. However, 
if environmental benefits are related to the age of the forest then our results show that this 
type of urban containment is also a poor policy to increase the provision of this type of 
nontimber benefits. Since the forest landowner does not take into account nontimber 
                                                 
26 Even if nontimber benefits are not associated with the age of the stand and are just related with the 
existence of undeveloped land, it is not certain whether an UGB can actually protect land from urban 
conversion and preserve open space. Imposition of an UGB implies that local governments can guess 
correctly when it would be socially efficient to convert land into urban use. As mentioned in Brueckner 
(2001), without a careful inquiry into the sources of market failure leading to urban sprawl, there is a danger 
that an UGB may be too stringent. And if that is the case, then the UGB would lead to an inappropriate 
escalation of housing costs and unwarranted increases in density, decreasing society’s welfare. 
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benefits from the forest when choosing the optimal length of a forest cycle, the private 
rotation period (in this case the Faustmann rotation date) is not socially optimal.27  
 
4.2. Threat of Development Prohibition  
Next, consider the case where an urban containment policy has not been imposed yet at 
. Until it actually occurs, the policy is just a threat to the landowner. The type and 
future location of the urban containment policy is known with certainty by the landowner. 
However, the point in time at which the development restriction by the policy is imposed 
on the property is uncertain.
0=t
28 Thus, prior to the implementation of the urban containment 
policy, a landowner beyond the (then future) boundary knows that he has the right to 
develop the land now, but will lose or have most of his development rights reduced when 
the urban containment policy goes into effect. 
Following Turnbull (2005), our regulatory environment is now represented by a 
stochastic survival model. Let )()( tgxθ  represent the probability that a development 
prohibition is imposed by time  and t
t
tgx
∂
∂ )()(θ  the probability that the development 
prohibition is imposed at t , with )(xθ  a positive nonstochastic parameter used to capture 
changes in the probability structure. 
                                                 
27 Regulations under the Federal Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act and the Endangered Species Act can help 
improve the environmental performance of forestry operations by directly regulating management activities. 
For example, if an endangered species is found in an area where timber is harvested, the ESA may be used to 
place a moratorium on timber harvest. But on the other hand, because they reduce the private owner’s ability 
to realize value from a working forest, private forest owners might be compelled to consider other uses for 
their forests (for example agriculture). What actually happens on forested land depends on a set of policy 
interrelations and policy coordination. Further consideration of this point is warranted, but goes beyond the 
scope of this paper, and so is left for future work. 
28 Landowners can be well informed about the future location of an UGB long before it is actually imposed 
due to public meetings and press coverage of the political charged process. 
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We assume 
t
tgx
∂
∂ )()(θ  to be positive, which reflects that the longer the landowner waits 
before harvesting, the more likely that he will lose the possibility to convert land. Also, the 
dependence of the non-stochastic parameter on location ( x ) reflects that land can be a 
source of different types of open space externality. Hence, a greater value of )(xθ  implies a 
greater probability of the development restriction being imposed on the landowner by time 
 because the plot of land at location t x  has been identified as being a source of a particular 
environmental externality. 
 
Threat of Temporarily Development Prohibition 
Before we modify the objective function of the landowner under the possibility of a 
binding UGB set at some , begin by noting that the maximum present value of 
returns to the land at location 
ppTKt ≤
x  when an UGB is imposed at some t  prior to the land being 
converted to residential use is given by: 
∫
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where T~  is the optimal private rotation date when an UGB is set at time t , is the 
time length of the UGB and 
UGBxt )(
ppTK  is the private optimal conversion date in the absence of 
any threat. The optimal conversion date when an UGB is set at time  satisfies 
.
t
ppUGB TKxttTK >+= )(~~ 29
                                                 
29 Setting , (21) simplifies to (15), which is the present value of returns to the land when a binding UGB 
occurs at . In this case, 
0=t
0=t ccTKTK =~~ . 
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At  the landowner’s expected returns to his plot of land takes into account the 
possible conditional development strategy 
0=t
{ }Txt UGB ~,)(  in the event the constraint is 
imposed at some . Under this threat, the landowner’s objective function can be 
expressed as: 
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The first term on the right-hand-side of (22) is the present value of the returns to land 
weighted by the probability that the land is not prohibited from residential conversion prior 
to KT . The second term on the right-hand-side of (22) takes into account the likelihood 
that land at location x  be under a development prohibition at some time between  and 
. Note that  is the present value of returns to land from t  onwards, 
given that land at location 
0=t
KTt = ))(,,~( UGBxttTV
x  is prohibited from being converted until time . 
Weighting this term by the probability that land is prohibited at time t  to be converted to 
residential use and integrating over 
UGBxtt )(+
[ ]KT,0 , yields the expected value of the private returns 
to the land in that case. The optimal rotation date given K , , satisfies the following 
condition: 
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The optimality condition in (23) has a simple interpretation that is best seen when it is 
compared to equation (13) and is different only because of the additional term associated 
with the threat of a temporary development prohibition. The risk that conversion to 
residential use will be constrained by a temporary development prohibition is measured by 
)()(1
)()(
KTgx
K
t
KTgx
θ
θ
−
∂
∂
 which represents the hazard rate, that is, the probability that a development 
prohibition is imposed at , given that land has survived to that prohibition up to that 
time. For better insight, equation (23) can be re-written as: 
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It is clear from inspection of (24) and (13) that, for a given K , optimal rotation 
decreases with a potential temporary development prohibition, that is, ptu TT < .30 Given 
the threatened loss of residential rents during an UGB ban, the landowner’s optimal 
response is to anticipate harvesting dates, sacrificing some timber revenues but at the same 
time increasing the probability that the private planned conversion of forestland to 
residential use will be allowed to take place without delay. In particular, we would have an 
earlier conversion to residential use as a result of the threat, ptu KTKT < . This result 
implies, nevertheless, the landowner cannot adjust the number of rotation cycles. 
When K  can be adjusted, the net impact of a potential development prohibition on 
private conversion date is ambiguous. Note first that the probability that a development 
restriction is imposed by time t  increases over time ( 0)( >
∂
∂
t
tg ). If ptu KK ≤ , the impact on 
                                                 
30 The right-hand side of (24) is positive since 0
)(
>
∂
∂
t
KTg
 and ))(,,~(),( UGBpppP xtTKTVTKV > , while 
in the unconstrained case the right-hand side of (24) is zero. 
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the number of rotation cycles reinforces the effect of shorter rotations on conversion date, 
anticipating conversion time. If ptu KK >  then a countervailing effect from increasing the 
number of rotation cycles may dominate, postponing conversion time. Since conversion to 
residential use occurs at the end of a rotation cycle, the optimal response may be to have 
more rotation cycles of shorter length.31 As a result, unregulated forestland may be 
converted later in the presence of a potential development prohibition.32 This result 
contrasts with previous results that show that a threat of a development prohibition 
unambiguously hasten urban development (Turnbull (2004, 2005)). 
 
Threat of Permanent Development Prohibition 
Now let’s assume there is a threat of a permanent development prohibition at some 
. In this case, the expected present value of returns to the land can be expressed 
as: 
ppTKt ≤
[ ]
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                 (25) 
where )()( KTgxθ  represents the probability that a permanent development prohibition is 
imposed by time KT . 
                                                 
31 An increase in K  increases the riskiness of the investment returns from waiting to convert land into an 
urban use. This effect, on its own, would speed the date of conversion. But an increase in K  has other effects 
that work to delay development. Since a decrease in rotation length decreases the hazard rate, the increase in 
the number of rotation cycles can help to recover some of the timber revenue losses from anticipating rotation 
date. The net effect on the rotation date is thus ambiguous. 
32 Let tuK  be the optimal rotation cycles in the presence of a threat of a temporary development prohibition. 
Given that ptu TT <  for a given K , this implies that ptututu TKTK < . On the other hand, if 
pptutu TKTK >  and if ptu TT < , then it must be the case where ptu KK > . 
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According to (25), the landowner is guaranteed the present value of timber revenue over 
infinite cycles of rotations (that is, the value of land under the Faustmann setting, ), 
regardless of the development restriction. The landowner can, however, earn the increment 
from residential development, but only if land is converted to residential use before the 
permanent prohibition is put into place. Thus, this increment from residential use is 
weighted by the probability that no permanent prohibition has been imposed before the 
conversion time. The optimal landowner strategy is the 
)(TV F
{ }pupu TK , , satisfying the following 
conditions: 
[ ]                                                          (26) )(),(
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Conditions (27) and (28) are related to the date of land conversion and have the same 
interpretations as before. Equation (26) is the rotation date condition, which is modified for 
the risk of a permanent development prohibition.33 For a given K , this risk increases the 
marginal cost of letting a stand grow in terms of forgone value derived from future 
conversion to residential use. Therefore, rotation cycles are shorter compared to the 
                                                 
33 In the absence of policy uncertainty ( 0)( =KTg ), equation (26) becomes the first-order condition of the 
forester’s unconstrained problem, (13). On the other hand, if the forested land can never be converted to any 
urban use ( ), equation (26) shows that the private landowner problem is the Faustmann 
maximization problem ( ).  
1)( =KTg
)(),( TVTKV FP =
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unconstrained case ( 0),( =
∂
∂
T
TKV P ) since  and )(),( TVTKV FP > 0)( >
∂
∂
t
KTg .34 Moreover, 
shorter rotation dates imply earlier conversion of unregulated forestland than otherwise 
( pKTuKT < ). Like in the previous case, if the number of rotation cycles can be adjusted, 
the net effect of a potential permanent development prohibition on forestland conversion is 
ambiguous. A comparison between (26) and (24) reveals nevertheless that forestland will 
be converted earlier under a threat of a permanent development prohibition than under a 
potential temporary development ban as long as . Moreover, a 
comparison between the generalized procedure in table 3:Appendix-A and table 
4:Appendix-A also reveals that if forest management practices are exogenous, then 
anticipated urban containment policies can narrow real options in land markets and 
potentially accelerate land development. 
)())(,,~( TVxtKTTV FUGB >
Finally, different types of land can differ on their likelihood of being prevented from 
development. To assess the permanent development prohibition effect on rotation dates, 
totally differentiate equation (26) and for better insight, evaluate at 0)( =xθ : 
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                                                                         (29) 
As )(xθ  increases (for example because land generates larger environmental 
externalities), the shorter will be the optimal rotation. The reason is because as )(xθ  
increases, the probability of a permanent development prohibition increases, which creates 
                                                 
34 The behavior of  over time can reflect that the longer the landowner waits before harvesting, the more 
likely that he will lose the possibility to convert land because endangered species may move to old growths, 
which may trigger regulation. In our model, nontimber benefits from older trees occur when  is 
increasing over time. Thus, as stand age increases, the probability of endangered species inhabitation and 
permanent development prohibition increases, causing a decrease in the age at which the forest is harvested.  
)(tg
)(tF
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a greater incentive to preempt the regulation with earlier clear-cuts, destroying those 
characteristics of the land (in this case the size of the trees) that would trigger the 
regulation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Developing better land-use decision making models is extremely important as policy 
makers increase reliance on land use conversion policies to achieve environmental goals 
such as habitat preservation and carbon sequestration through better management of forests. 
This paper presents a model of a single forest landowner that allows for switching between 
forest and residential development at some point in the future and takes into account stand-
age-dependent nontimber benefits. Within this framework, we examine the impact of actual 
and anticipated urban containment policies on the protection and use of private real 
property to achieve environmental goals. While our model is developed to account for the 
specific case of residential use at some point in the future, the model is more broadly 
applicable to other situations such as reversible conversion decisions to agriculture. 
All else being equal, a large undeveloped forest landscape usually is perceived as 
offering better scenery, more and less crowded recreation opportunities, and greater habitat 
and resource protection than a smaller more-developed forest landscape. As such more 
populated and rapidly growing communities and states have engaged in urban containment 
policies aiming to manage urban growth and protect open space. 
Our results show nevertheless that without both land protection from conversion to 
irreversible uses and effective land management practices, social values associated to the 
age of a private forest stand cannot be achieved. Moreover, policymakers should take into 
account the interdependencies between alternative land uses when setting incentives for 
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private landowners to preserve forestland. The reason is because these interdependencies 
create feedback effects, which affect private landowners' management decisions. 
Urban containment policies can have positive environmental impacts by forbidding or 
delaying development, but do not regulate management practices. In particular, greenbelts 
offer more permanent forestland protection than UGBs. However, if environmental benefits 
are related to the age of the forest, our results show that both UGBs and Greenbelts are poor 
instruments to increase the provision of such benefits. In general, these results hold under 
certainty as well as under uncertainty to the time at which a development prohibition is 
imposed. Even though it is always optimal to anticipate harvesting time to avoid potential 
development prohibitions, the private landowner may optimally choose to convert later his 
forestland by adjusting the number of rotation cycles. This effect cannot be captured if the 
opportunity cost of the current use of land is taken as exogenous. Our results thus imply 
that integrated land-use policies will maximize forests nontimber benefits. 
Finally, we also show that forestland conversion decisions should be based on real 
option theory and not on the traditional net present value rule even in a context of certainty. 
In particular, our results show that the net present value bias conversion decisions towards 
immediate development. 
There are a couple of ways in which our model might be explored in future research. 
We have considered optimal management practices at the timber stand level, abstracting 
away from the impact that changing management practices might have on equilibrium 
prices at higher levels of scale. Moreover, we focused on clear-cut harvesting. Other types 
of harvesting practices such as partial harvesting can have different impacts on the 
provision of nontimber benefits. Finally, often, forest use competes with agriculture, 
implying that conversion to an alternative use does not necessarily involve deforestation. 
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Table 1: Alternative Criteria for Determining Rotation Date under Certainty 
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Table 2: Rule for Optimal Conversion Date for Society (including nontimber benefits) 
under Certainty 
 
Criteria Decision Rule for Immediate Conversion 
Functional Form c   
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Table 3: Alternative Criteria for Determining Conversion Date for the Private 
Landowner (ignoring nontimber benefits) under Certainty 
 
Criteria Decision Rules for Immediate Conversion 
Functional Form c   
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Generalized Procedure  b
0>DT , T  endogenous,  ∞<< K0
 
Endogenous forest management 
practices and feedback effects from 
changes in K  affect both the NPV 
(left-hand-side) and the option value 
of waiting (right-hand-side) 
)(
)(
)()(
)(
)(
1
)))(((),0(
1
)))(((),0(
KKTr
KTr
KTrKKT
KTr
KTr
e
e
ecKTpvD
r
exR
e
ecKTpvD
r
xR
′−
′−
′−
′−
′−
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
−−
−′
≥
−
−
−−
−′
α
α
α  
a For convenience we set . 00 =c
b We assume an interior solution for K  if land is not converted immediately. For convenience we also set 
. 00 =c
c This functional form is chosen because it is a flexible functional form that is twice differentiable and 
integrable. 
 
Table 4: Alternative Criteria for Determining Conversion Date for the Private 
Landowner (ignoring nontimber benefits) in the Presence of a threat of a 
Development Prohibition 
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where r ′ is the constant rate at which the landowner discounts future rents 
and α  is the growth rate of residential rents. 
Temporary 
Development 
Prohibition 
)(
)()(
0
)(
)(
)()(
)(
)(
1
)))(((
))(()())(,,~(
)(
)(
1
)))(((),0(
))(()(1(
1
)))(((),0(
KTr
KTrKKT
UGB
KKTr
KTr
KTrKKT
KTr
KTr
e
ecKTpv
KKTgxdtxttTV
t
tg
x
e
e
ecKTpv
D
r
exR
KKTgx
e
ecKTpv
D
r
xR
′−
′−
′−
′−
′−
′−
′−
−
−
−
∂
∂
+
+
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
−−
−′
−
≥
−
−
−−
−′
∫ θθ
α
θ
α
α
a We assume no nontimber benefits, an interior solution for K if 0≠K . For convenience we also set 00 =c . 
 
Appendix B  
The analytical derivations of equations (3), (8) and (13). 
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Equation (3). The housing bid rent is determined via the open-city assumption, under 
which the time path of utility is given by an exogenous function . Substituting for )(tU g  
using the budget constraint, the representative urban resident achieves utility )(tU  when  
satisfies the equation: 
b
)()1,)()(( tUxtzbtyU =−−                                                                                             (B1) 
Equation (B1) implies that in equilibrium, utility must be identical regardless where an 
urban resident lives; otherwise, some urban residents will have an incentive to move. 
Equation (B1) also implicitly defines the housing bid rent function as:  
))(),1,)()((),( tUxtztybxtb −=                                                                                        (B2) 
that is, equation (3).  
Equations (8) and (13). By maximizing (7) with respect to T , for a given K , we obtain: 
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Dividing (B3) by rT
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,  yields equation (8). 
In the case of the private landowner’s problem a similar derivation can be undertaken, 
except that the externalities’ terms are not present. So, (13) is obtained. 
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